Does Conditionality Mitigate the Potential Negative Effect of Aid on Revenues?
āĻā§āĻĒā§āĻ¤ā§ ā§¨ā§Ļā§§ā§Ŧ ¡ International Monetary Fund
āĻāĻŦā§āĻ
28
āĻĒā§āĻˇā§āĻ āĻž
reportāĻŽā§āĻ˛ā§āĻ¯āĻžāĻāĻāĻ¨ āĻā§°ā§ āĻĒā§°ā§āĻ¯āĻžāĻ˛ā§āĻāĻ¨āĻž āĻ¸āĻ¤ā§āĻ¯āĻžāĻĒāĻ¨ āĻā§°āĻž āĻšā§ā§ąāĻž āĻ¨āĻžāĻ  āĻ
āĻ§āĻŋāĻ āĻāĻžāĻ¨āĻ
āĻāĻ āĻāĻŦā§āĻāĻāĻ¨ā§° āĻŦāĻŋāĻˇā§ā§
This paper assesses whether conditionality in IMF-supported programs has helped offset the potential negative effect of foreign aid on tax revenues. The analysisâcarried out on panel data covering 1993â2012 for 111 low- and middle-income countriesâshows that growing use of revenue conditionality by low-income countries partially offsets the depressing effect of foreign grants on tax revenue, particularly on taxes on goods and services. The impact of conditionality is strong in countries where aid dependence is high and where institutions are strong, suggesting that revenue conditionality cannot substitute for weak institutions in mitigating the negative effect of aid on tax revenue collection.
āĻāĻ āĻāĻŦā§āĻāĻāĻ¨āĻ āĻŽā§āĻ˛ā§āĻ¯āĻžāĻāĻāĻ¨ āĻā§°āĻ
āĻāĻŽāĻžāĻ āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻžā§° āĻŽāĻ¤āĻžāĻŽāĻ¤ āĻāĻ¨āĻžāĻāĻāĨ¤
āĻĒāĻĸāĻŧāĻžā§° āĻ¨āĻŋāĻ°ā§āĻĻā§āĻļāĻžā§ąāĻ˛ā§
āĻ¸ā§āĻŽāĻžā§°ā§āĻāĻĢâāĻ¨ āĻā§°ā§ āĻā§āĻŦāĻ˛ā§āĻ
Android āĻā§°ā§ iPad/iPhoneā§° āĻŦāĻžāĻŦā§ Google Play Books āĻāĻĒāĻā§ āĻāĻ¨āĻˇā§āĻāĻ˛ āĻā§°āĻāĨ¤ āĻ āĻ¸ā§āĻŦāĻ¯āĻŧāĻāĻā§āĻ°āĻŋāĻ¯āĻŧāĻāĻžā§ąā§ āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻžā§° āĻāĻāĻžāĻāĻŖā§āĻā§° āĻ¸ā§āĻ¤ā§ āĻāĻŋāĻāĻ āĻšāĻ¯āĻŧ āĻā§°ā§ āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻŋ āĻ¯'āĻ¤ā§ āĻ¨āĻžāĻĨāĻžāĻāĻ āĻ¤'āĻ¤ā§āĻ āĻā§āĻ¨ā§ āĻ
āĻĄāĻŋāĻ
'āĻŦā§āĻ āĻ
āĻ¨āĻ˛āĻžāĻāĻ¨ āĻŦāĻž āĻ
āĻĢāĻ˛āĻžāĻāĻ¨āĻ¤ āĻļā§āĻ¨āĻŋāĻŦāĻ˛ā§ āĻ¸ā§āĻŦāĻŋāĻ§āĻž āĻĻāĻŋāĻ¯āĻŧā§āĨ¤
āĻ˛ā§āĻĒāĻāĻĒ āĻā§°ā§ āĻāĻŽā§āĻĒāĻŋāĻāĻāĻžā§°
āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻŋ āĻāĻŽā§āĻĒāĻŋāĻāĻāĻžā§°ā§° ā§ąā§āĻŦ āĻŦā§āĻ°āĻžāĻāĻāĻžā§° āĻŦā§āĻ¯ā§ąāĻšāĻžā§° āĻā§°āĻŋ Google PlayāĻ¤ āĻāĻŋāĻ¨āĻž āĻ
āĻĄāĻŋāĻ
'āĻŦā§āĻāĻ¸āĻŽā§āĻš āĻļā§āĻ¨āĻŋāĻŦ āĻĒāĻžā§°ā§āĨ¤
āĻ-ā§°ā§āĻĄāĻžā§° āĻā§°ā§ āĻ
āĻ¨ā§āĻ¯ āĻĄāĻŋāĻāĻžāĻāĻ
Kobo eReadersā§° āĻĻā§°ā§ āĻ-āĻāĻŋā§āĻžāĻāĻšā§ā§° āĻĄāĻŋāĻāĻžāĻāĻāĻ¸āĻŽā§āĻšāĻ¤ āĻĒā§āĻŋāĻŦāĻ˛ā§, āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻŋ āĻāĻāĻž āĻĢāĻžāĻāĻ˛ āĻĄāĻžāĻāĻ¨āĻ˛âāĻĄ āĻā§°āĻŋ āĻ¸ā§āĻāĻā§ āĻāĻĒā§āĻ¨āĻžā§° āĻĄāĻŋāĻāĻžāĻāĻāĻ˛ā§ āĻ¸ā§āĻĨāĻžāĻ¨āĻžāĻ¨ā§āĻ¤ā§°āĻŖ āĻā§°āĻŋāĻŦ āĻ˛āĻžāĻāĻŋāĻŦāĨ¤ āĻ¸āĻŽā§°ā§āĻĨāĻŋāĻ¤ āĻ-ā§°āĻŋāĻĄāĻžā§°āĻ˛ā§ āĻĢāĻžāĻāĻ˛āĻā§ āĻā§āĻ¨ā§āĻā§ āĻ¸ā§āĻĨāĻžāĻ¨āĻžāĻ¨ā§āĻ¤ā§° āĻā§°āĻŋāĻŦ āĻāĻžāĻ¨āĻŋāĻŦāĻ˛ā§ āĻ¸āĻšāĻžāĻ¯āĻŧ āĻā§āĻ¨ā§āĻĻā§ā§°āĻ¤ āĻĨāĻāĻž āĻ¸āĻŦāĻŋāĻļā§āĻˇ āĻ¨āĻŋā§°ā§āĻĻā§āĻļāĻžā§ąāĻ˛ā§ āĻāĻžāĻāĻāĨ¤
