Human Capacities and Moral Status

ยท Philosophy and Medicine ืกืคืจ 108 ยท Springer Science & Business Media
ืกืคืจ ื“ื™ื’ื™ื˜ืœื™
208
ื“ืคื™ื
ื”ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ื“ื™ืจื•ื’ื™ื ืœื ืžืื•ืžืชื™ืย ืžื™ื“ืข ื ื•ืกืฃ

ืžื™ื“ืข ืขืœ ื”ืกืคืจ ื”ื“ื™ื’ื™ื˜ืœื™ ื”ื–ื”

Many debates about the moral status of thingsโ€”for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animalsโ€”eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in questionโ€”for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often controversial: if a humanโ€™s capacities are the basis of its moral status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? This book answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about situations involving "temporary incapacitation"โ€”where a human organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacityโ€”this book argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy, bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy.

ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื“ืจื’ ืืช ื”ืกืคืจ ื”ื“ื™ื’ื™ื˜ืœื™ ื”ื–ื”?

ื ืฉืžื— ืœืฉืžื•ืข ืžื” ื“ืขืชืš.

ืื™ืš ืงื•ืจืื™ื ืืช ื”ืกืคืจ

ืกืžืืจื˜ืคื•ื ื™ื ื•ื˜ืื‘ืœื˜ื™ื
ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืฆืจื™ืš ืœืขืฉื•ืช ื”ื•ื ืœื”ืชืงื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืืคืœื™ืงืฆื™ื” ืฉืœ Google Play Books ืœ-Android ืื• ืœ-iPad/iPhoneโ€. ื”ื™ื ืžืกืชื ื›ืจื ืช ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืื•ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื™ ืขื ื”ื—ืฉื‘ื•ืŸ ืฉืœืš ื•ืžืืคืฉืจืช ืœืš ืœืงืจื•ื ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื, ื’ื ืœืœื ื—ื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืœืื™ื ื˜ืจื ื˜.
ืžื—ืฉื‘ื™ื ื ื™ื™ื“ื™ื ื•ืฉื•ืœื—ื ื™ื™ื
ื ื™ืชืŸ ืœื”ืื–ื™ืŸ ืœืกืคืจื™ ืื•ื“ื™ื• ืฉื ืจื›ืฉื• ื‘-Google Play ื‘ืืžืฆืขื•ืช ื“ืคื“ืคืŸ ื”ืื™ื ื˜ืจื ื˜ ืฉืœ ื”ืžื—ืฉื‘.
eReaders ื•ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ื ืื—ืจื™ื
ื›ื“ื™ ืœืงืจื•ื ื‘ืžื›ืฉื™ืจื™ื ืขื ืชืฆื•ื’ืช ื“ื™ื• ืืœืงื˜ืจื•ื ื™ (e-ink) ื›ืžื• ื”ืงื•ืจืื™ื ื”ืืœืงื˜ืจื•ื ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ Kobo, ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ื•ืจื™ื“ ืงื•ื‘ืฅ ื•ืœื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ืื•ืชื• ืœืžื›ืฉื™ืจ. ื™ืฉ ืœืคืขื•ืœ ืœืคื™ ื”ื”ื•ืจืื•ืช ื”ืžืคื•ืจื˜ื•ืช ื‘ืžืจื›ื– ื”ืขื–ืจื” ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืงื‘ืฆื™ื ืœืงื•ืจืื™ื ืืœืงื˜ืจื•ื ื™ื™ื ื ืชืžื›ื™ื.

ืœื”ืžืฉืš ืงืจื™ืื” ืฉืœ ื”ืกื“ืจื”

ืกืคืจื™ื ื“ื™ื’ื™ื˜ืœื™ื™ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื