Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives
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Inquiry is a fundamental human practice. We have questions, and we want answers. These questions span numerous domains and range from the trivial to questions of the utmost importance. Without inquiry, and successful inquiry in particular, our fate is bleak. Inquiry is also familiar. Everyone engages in inquiry. In fact, inquiry (of some sort) is something that we engage in every day. However, while inquiry is both fundamental and familiar, only recently have epistemologists turned to focus explicitly on inquiry. The result is a growing literature concerning questions like the following:
- Does inquiry have an aim?
- If so, what is the aim of inquiry?
- What norms govern inquiry?
- How are epistemic norms and norms of inquiry related?
- What does inquiry look like with an epistemic division of labor?
- Is it ever permissible to interfere with the inquiry of another person?
- What is the relationship between inquiry and belief? Knowledge? Wisdom?
- How do bias and prejudice affect inquiry?
- What is the nature and role of attitudes like curiosity and wonder?
Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives builds on the existing debates surrounding these questions, advancing them, and taking them in new directions. It will appeal primarily to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
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Aaron B. Creller is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of North Florida. His research areas are cross-cultural approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science. His recent monograph is the 2018 Making Space for Knowing: A Capacious Approach to Comparative Epistemology.
Jonathan Matheson is a professor of philosophy at the University of North Florida and the director of the Florida Blue Center for Ethics, where he is also a distinguished faculty fellow. His research interests are in epistemology where his work has focused on the epistemic significance of disagreement, as well as the nature and value of epistemic autonomy.
